The long-awaited ceasefire and hostage release deal between Hamas and Israel finally began on January 19, after 15 months of intense fighting, thousands of casualties on both sides, destruction, and immense pain, all ignited by Hamas’ brutal attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. Israelis imprisoned in the dark tunnels of Gaza for so long are at last being freed, and reunited with their loved ones.
To see the deal through will require overcoming major challenges.
The first is borne out of semantics. The text of the ceasefire agreement is a masterclass of internal contradictions, vagueness, and word choices that enable both sides to claim they did not compromise on their key demands. In that context, the most impressive verbal manoeuvres can be seen in the parts of the agreement regarding the possible end of the war - a “permanent ceasefire” (instead ‘end of the war’ for example), along with other terms open to interpretation.
Indeed, the ceasefire deal is a classic example of the application of the late US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s famous “constructive ambiguity” concept of using vague terms with multiple meanings so that the parties involved can interpret the agreement in line with their goals. Critics of the “constructive ambiguity” approach argue that it leads to confusion and disagreements, with critical details missing, thereby hindering smooth implementation of agreements.
A second major hurdle that endangers the ceasefire is Hamas itself. Can today’s weakened and much smaller version of the terror organisation deliver on its commitments? Does it even know where all the hostages are? (Hamas asked for periods without Israeli surveillance so they could locate all hostages.) In the background are power struggles between Hamas leadership within Gaza and officials of the organisation residing abroad, who are more susceptible to pressure by mediators, mostly from Qatar. And how motivated is this jihadist extremist terror group, even if beaten, to respect the terms of the deal? We have already seen “games” (such as last-minute delays or changes in the identity of the hostages to be freed) apparently designed to show Israel that Hamas still has authority and control over both Gaza and the implementation of the ceasefire.
Israeli politics is the third factor mitigating against the deal’s success.
The right-wing government of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is under severe stress because of the agreement. The far-right Jewish Power (Otzma Yehudit) party, led by the controversial Itamar Ben Gvir, left the coalition in protest over the deal. The party claims the deal is dangerous and a sign of weakness. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, head of the right-wing Religious Zionism party, also objected to the ceasefire and forced Netanyahu to promise that the war will resume if Hamas does not meet the terms of the deal — a commitment allegedly backed by US President Donald Trump. Smotrich and others on the far right have high hopes that Trump will allow them to push forward with their agenda to annex at least parts of the West Bank. Meanwhile, the whole government is hopeful Trump will finally definitively address the strategic threat posed by Iran’s nuclear weapons program definitively.
'The text of the ceasefire agreement is a masterclass of internal contradictions, vagueness, and word choices that enable both sides to claim they did not compromise on their key demands.'
Trump, however, has expressed his wish that the Hamas-Israel ceasefire would “hold” and is planning to leverage what he sees as his own success in sealing the deal toward further expanding Israel’s ties with Arab and Muslim states. In particular, the President is hoping to entice Saudi Arabia into normalising relations with Israel as part of the Abraham Accords framework, believing that this would open the door for other countries to join the alliance with Israel.
The ayatollahs in Teheran are watching these developments with great concern. An Israel-Saudi pact would greatly enhance the regional anti-Iran camp. The network of Iran-aligned proxies across the Middle East — Hamas, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Shi’ite militias in Syria and Iraq — have all been weakened or are facing being dismantled following their interventions in the Israel-Hamas war. The fall of the Assad regime at the beginning of December means Iranians are no longer welcome in Syria and can no longer use Damascus to re-supply weapons to Hezbollah — which is at its weakest in decades. Meanwhile, in Lebanon, pro-Saudi, pro-West politicians, such as newly minted President Joseph Aoun, now hold power. Thus, Iran may seek to disrupt the ceasefire; however, it is not clear if the regime is even capable of doing so effectively.
Despite all these possible hurdles, so far, the first phase of the agreement is going ahead as planned. Israeli hostages are being gradually freed from captivity, and Palestinian prisoners are being released from Israeli jails. Aid flow to Gazans has greatly increased, and the Israeli army is redeploying, allowing Palestinians to return to their often-severely damaged homes in the north of the strip.
Discussions about the trickier second phase are slated to begin on Feb 4. On the table are: how (and if) to end the war; enabling the reconstruction of Gaza; freeing the rest of the 60 plus Israeli hostages, dead or alive, in exchange for more Palestinian prisoners; and arrangements and maps of additional Israeli withdrawals from the strip.
Above all else, hover several essential questions.
What will be the future of the Gaza Strip, the nature of relations between Palestinians and Israelis? And what will be the role of the rival factions and ideologies within the Palestinian camp?
As of now, not a single feasible plan has been put forward for the ‘day-after’ in the Gaza Strip. An estimated US$40 to 80 billion is urgently needed to begin the years-long process of reconstructing the area, where almost all infrastructure and houses have been damaged during the war, according to reports - including private homes, hospitals, water and electricity infrastructure, and more. But who would donate or invest in a war-ravaged area under the (at least partial) control of a terrorist group and/or in chaos, with no one truly responsible for good governance and law and order?
Many point to the Palestinian Authority (PA) as the one element that must be a part, if not the lead administrators, in any post-war governing body in Gaza. However, the PA is riddled with corruption, is extremely unpopular among Palestinians, has failed to impose its authority on organised crime and terror groups in the West Bank (as the recent unsuccessful effort in Jenin has shown), and routinely educates and incites the population it rules to support violence against Israel. What’s more, the PA openly violates the human rights of its own people and may soon spiral into an ugly succession battle once 89-year-old President Mahmoud Abbas exits the stage.
Fatah, the secular party in control of the PA, has failed again and again to reach any agreement with its sworn enemy Hamas to enable a smooth takeover of Gaza by the PA. The current Israeli government has no trust in the intentions or abilities of the PA either. Moreover, October 7, and widespread support it received on the Palestinian street, are seen by most of the Israeli public as proof that significant reconciliation with the Palestinians is not possible in the near future.
Considering all this, a realistic policy must prioritise stability before any other goal.
Israel is a strong, democratic and mature society that has already begun the painful route of rebuilding from the ashes of October 7. This will include a process of hard soul-searching and self-reflection - but time is needed for the wounds to start healing.
On the other side, Gaza urgently needs reconstruction before anything else. The US and other countries, including Australia, can play a positive role in providing support, funds, and guidance to international organisations and the UN (with a different agency to replace UNWRA, which perpetuated Palestinian demands to flood Israel with refugees and employed and cooperated with terrorists and extremists). First and foremost, there is a need to rebuild schools, medical facilities and other infrastructure, revive the economy, and offer hope for Gazans. These are preconditions for introducing alternative values, ethos and ideologies which sanctify life and prioritise promoting the welfare of all Palestinians — and this is the only pathway to eventually rooting out the extremist jihadist death-cult of Hamas.
Discussing measures aimed at combining reconstruction with de-radicalisation should be the first step, before any talk about Palestinian self-governance and a long-term solution for the conflict can begin.
Dr Ran Porat is a researcher at the Australian Centre for Jewish Civilisation, Monash University.
Main image: The helicopter with the three released hostages arrives at Sheba Medical Center, also known as Tel HaShomer Hospital, where hostages are arriving after the first phase of a ceasefire agreement began between Israel and Hamas on January 19, 2025 in Ramat Gan, Israel. A total of 33 Israeli hostages, taken captive by Hamas and allied groups on Oct. 7, 2023, were to be released in the first phase of the ceasefire, in exchange for 1,890 Palestinian prisoners. Of the 251 hostages taken on Oct. 7, 94 are still held in Gaza, with 60 assumed to be living and 34 dead. (Photo by Alexi J. Rosenfeld/Getty Images)