Shakedown: Australia's grab for Timor Oil, by Paul Cleary. Allen & Unwin, Australia, 2007. ISBN 9781741149265. RRP $29.95
Ugly. Rapacious. Bruising and governed by the narrowest definitions of national interest. These are a few of the descriptions that spring to mind after reading this devastating portrait of Australia’s negotiations over oil and gas resources in the Timor Sea.
A thorough account of foreign policy thinking in the 1970s demonstrates how, early on in the piece, the Timor Sea influenced Australia’s overall position on Timor. Indeed, just days after a 1974 coup in Portugal, officials in Canberra were arguing that Australia would get a better deal on a maritime boundary if Indonesia controlled Timor, rather than an independent Timor or its colonial power, Portugal.
Similarly, in 1978, then foreign minister Andrew Peacock announced that Australia was formally accepting East Timor as part of Indonesia. This paved the way for a formal recognition of Indonesia’s occupation. In the words of the author of this book, "the only reason for this speedy decision, was the seabed and boundary, which of course meant oil".
The well-researched first third of the book shows Australia’s Timor tragedy, and the part oil and gas resources played in it, to be a substantial foreign policy edifice built up over decades. But the real cut and thrust of the story comes post-1999.
In January 2000 the retreating Indonesians had levelled Timor’s capital Dili so comprehensively that a team of visiting Australia diplomats had to book a negotiating room on a cruise ship in Dili harbour. Accommodation aside, they lost no time trying to convince the Timorese that they should accept the Timor Gap Treaty. This Treaty, which Australia had spent 10 years pursuing with Indonesia, would have given Timor just 20 per cent share of the known resources on its side of the Timor Sea.
At this point in the book and at many others, it beggars belief that none of the Australian diplomats and foreign affairs officials sent to negotiate with Timor were troubled by Australia’s stance.
One notable exception is former DFAT staffer Bruce Haigh, whose analysis of the Australia-Indonesia-Timor nexus is particularly insightful. The 'big lie', that nothing untoward was happening in Timor during Indonesia’s occupation poisoned us, he says. "It had an effect on the ethics of this country. You see it being played out in the daily deniability games of Howard, and the federal public service".
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