In his March 15 address to a Canberra press gallery, former Labor Prime Minister Paul Keating was unsparing about those ‘seriously unwise ministers in government’ – notably Foreign Minister Penny Wong and Defence Minister Richard Marles, unimpressed by their uncritical embrace of the US war machine. ‘The Albanese Government’s complicity in joining with Britain and the United States in a tripartite build of a nuclear submarine for Australia under the AUKUS arrangements represents the worst international decision by an Australian Labor government since the former Labor leader, Billy Hughes, sought to introduce conscription to augment Australian forces in World War One.’
The bipartisanship extended to a meeting between Marles and Wong with their Coalition counterparts on September 15, 2021 just prior to the announcement of the security pact. Since then, questions loomed about acquisition, construction and delivery of the nuclear-propelled submarines. This month, the picture was made clearer, if troublingly so.
The scale of this project is staggering in cost projections, envisaging an outlay of $368 billion for up to eight vessels over three decades, with possibly more in the offing. Canberra will initially purchase at least three US-manufactured nuclear submarines while contributing ‘significant additional resources’ to US shipyards. Two more vessels are also being thrown in as a possibility, should the ‘need’ arise.
During this time, design and construction will take place on a new submarine dubbed the SSN-AUKUS, building on existing work undertaken by the UK on replacing the Astute-class submarines. It will be, according to the White House, ‘based upon the United Kingdom’s next generation SSN design while incorporating cutting edge US submarine technologies, and will be built and deployed by both Australia and the United Kingdom.’
The White House statement also promises visits by US nuclear submarines to Australia this year, with Australian personnel joining US crews for ‘training and development’. The UK will take its turn at the start of 2026. In 2027, a UK-US ‘Submarine Rotational Force-West’ (SRF-West) will be established at HMAS Stirling near Perth. It follows that Australia will be further militarised as a forward base in future US operations in the Indo-Pacific.
The agreement has been celebrated by a number of branches of industry as serving multiple purposes, with Prime Minister Albanese predicting somewhere in the order of 20,000 jobs. The national employer association Ai Group has called it ‘critical’ in not only protecting the country but delivering returns for ‘Australian industry and supply chains’.
'For all the salutes, flag waving and celebrations, the AUKUS balance sheet is looking increasingly bleak for the peacemakers, even as Australia enmeshes itself further within the US military apparatus and its lines of command and control.'
The association’s Chief Executive Innes Wilcox saw the prospect of ‘extensive spill-over benefits in technological advancement and technology sharing including around artificial intelligence and quantum technology with its promise of major developments in weapons, communications, sensing and computing technology.’
This projection must be read alongside the expenditure required for each job created over the course of three decades. As Tilman Ruff, a founder of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons argues, this would be a poor return given the risks posed by a naval arms race, proliferation, nuclear escalation and a war in East Asia. Then comes the issue of whether Australia can overcome the human resource challenges of such an enterprise, something former Coalition Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull is extremely doubtful of.
So far, all this remains hypothetical. Less hypothetical are the immediate benefits to flow to UK and US shipyards. In the absence of its own facilities to build such submarines, the Australian taxpayer is funding the naval industries of both countries. It was little wonder that British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak was reported to be ‘buzzing about it when he told ministers, smiling and bouncing on the balls of his feet.’
There is also little getting away from the fact that Australia’s history with submarines, typified by the Collins Class program and the ditching of the Barracuda Attack-class contract with the French Naval Group, is sketchy at best. Keating’s preference for 40 to 50 Collins Class submarines to police the Australian coastline rather than having nuclear powered submarines lying in wait off the Chinese shoreline does not take that into account.
The Collins Class building venture was a nightmarish project marred by bungling, poor planning and organisational dysfunction within the defence establishment. At stages, two-thirds of the Australian fleet of six submarines was unable to operate at full capacity. Nor were crews available in sufficient numbers to run the vessels. The lesson here is that submarines and the Australian naval complex simply do not mix.
West Australian Labor backbencher Josh Wilson, echoing the concerns of regional powers such as Indonesia and Malaysia, has also raised the issue of how ‘we can adequately deal with the non-proliferation risks involved in what is a novel arrangement, by which a non-nuclear weapons state under the NPT (Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty) comes to acquire weapons-grade material.’
To this can be added the problem of how to dispose of nuclear waste; for decades the Australian government has failed to identify and build a deep storage facility for low- to intermediate-level waste. Currently, the controversial selection of the Kimba site in South Australia is being litigated in the Federal Court by the Barngarla Determination Aboriginal Corporation (BDAC). The proposed facility does not cover the issues surrounding high-level waste typical from such submarines, which are bound to be even more contentious.
A gaggle of former senior Labor ministers have also emerged with questions and criticisms. unanswered questions. For former foreign minister, Gareth Evans, there were three questions to be answered on viability and operation: whether the submarines are actually fit for purpose; whether Australia retained genuine sovereignty over them in their use; and, were that not the case, ‘whether that loss of agency is a price worth paying for the US security insurance we think we might be buying.’
Kim Carr, who had previously held ministerial positions in industry and defence materiel, revealed that AUKUS had never been formally approved in the Federal Labor caucus, merely noted. Various ‘key’ Labor figures – again Marles and Wong – endorsed the proposition put forth to them on September 15, 2021 by the then Coalition government.
He also expressed deep concern ‘about a revival of a forward defence policy, given our performance in Vietnam’. For Carr, the shadow cast by the Iraq War was long. ‘Given it’s 20 years since Iraq, you can hardly say our security agencies should not be questioned when they provide their assessments.’
For all the salutes, flag waving and celebrations, the AUKUS balance sheet is looking increasingly bleak for the peacemakers, even as Australia enmeshes itself further within the US military apparatus and its lines of command and control. Tubagus Hasanuddin, a senior member of Indonesia’s ruling Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) has made the pertinent observation: ‘AUKUS is created for fighting.’
Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He currently lectures at RMIT University.
Main image: Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese (L), US President Joe Biden (C) and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak (R) hold a press conference after a trilateral meeting during the AUKUS summit on March 13, 2023 in San Diego, California. (Leon Neal/Getty Images)