The images of the September 11 terrorist attacks are now etched deeply into our psyche. The resultant global 'war on terror' has largely crystallised international efforts by governments to combat terrorism in a'new post-September 11 security environment'.
Struggling to respond effectively to the prospects of devastating attacks from a highly committed and unconventional foe, governments have adopted a range of exceptional and sometimes indiscriminate measures. Some of these measures have impinged significantly on important and longstanding conventions that have traditionally assured human and civil rights.
Covert intelligence operations have played a major role in the global war against an elusive enemy, and intelligence advice has been pivotal in the development of national and international responses to the threat of terrorism.
Because of the secrecy that invariably surrounds intelligence activities, the community remains largely oblivious to the true nature of intelligence and its inherent limitations. In national security matters the community has to trust in the government's integrity, and assurances that it would only act responsibly and with substantial justification.
While intelligence activities can include the collection, evaluation, collation and analysis of information, the overriding objective is to develop insights that provide direction for effective action (called intelligence product). A disciplined approach to the collection and analysis of information raises the level of confidence in the reliability and accuracy of the interpretations.
But even using multiple, diverse and independent information sources and the most critical and objective analysis, the intelligence produced remains intrinsically fallible because it always involves an element of human interpretation and subjectivity.
More than 20 years after the Hope Royal Commission spelt out the central role of analysis in transforming collected information into intelligence, and following a series of highly publicised intelligence failures, the Australian Government has moved to shield intelligence advice from further public scrutiny by blurring the vital distinction between intelligence activities and intelligence product — by portraying intelligence as 'covertly obtained information'.
Under this definition it is virtually impossible for the community to determine whether what is being presented as compelling 'evidence' of a serious and imminent threat is unassessed raw data or carefully evaluated intelligence product, and whether a proposed response is justified and proportionate. Intelligence can undoubtedly constitute a valuable source of advice in the absence of facts and evidence. But the sensitivity and intrinsic fallibility of this advice means that it is rarely suitable for use in the public domain or