Prime Minister Julia Gillard has invited people to say what they feel on the issue of how Australia should manage its borders, 'free of any sense of self-censorship or political correctness'. In contributing to what is likely to be a debate dominated by xenophobic voices, I would like to recall to readers what happened when an Australian Government last instructed the Australian Defence Force to vigorously deter and repel asylum-seeker boats.
On 2 September 2001, John Howard announced that he had ordered Australia's defence force to mount 'saturation surveillance' of international waters to Australia's north, as part of a military operation to repel and deter unauthorised asylum-seeker boats.
Some of the history of Operation Relex is set out in David Marr and Marian Wilkinson's book Dark Victory, and some in my book A Certain Maritime Incident: the Sinking of SIEV X. Much of it sits unread in the bulky Hansards and written testimonies submitted to the 2002 Senate Select Committee into a Certain Maritime Incident, evidence which was heavily abbreviated in the Committee's published report. Much of the history remains secret.
Many Australians have forgotten what happened. In essence, time-hallowed customary maritime laws regulating Safety of Life at Sea were quietly abandoned by Canberra's maritime safety authorities, in the case of boats deemed to be attempting unauthorised voyages. A two-tiered system of maritime safety resulted: one code of practice for 'legitimate' mariners, and a harsher code for boat people, with vicious consequences.
Firstly, there was an increased risk of loss of asylum-seeker life at sea. There were many deaths, which could and should have been avoided, on some intercepted boats and finally on the boat that failed to arrive, SIEV X.
Secondly, there was progressive brutalisation and demoralisation of ADF culture, as it succumbed to political pressure from Canberra to set aside its lawful protocols and procedures for aiding people in distress at sea.
What emerges from the record is a developing operational culture, flowing from the top of civilian and military chains of command, of systematic anger and contempt for boat people.
ADF personnel were under orders to take control of rescued or intercepted boats, to keep the passengers on board their own boats, and to try to send them back to Indonesia by force. The passengers responded with attempts to disable or even sink their boats at the time of interception or rescue, so that they could not