As word of the national security inquiry filtered through Twitter last week, one wit remarked, 'Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four is meant to be a cautionary tale, not a manual'.
Not enough Australians are aware that the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (JCIS) is considering reforms of national security legislation which would fling open state access to telecommunications content. Those alarmed by the scope of the changes, such as Electronic Frontiers Australia and the Pirate Party, have only until 6 August to send their submissions despite their requests for an extended deadline.
There are many areas of concern, such as expanding interception to social networking activities (Twitter and Facebook) and internet telephony (Skype), as well as lowering the threshold for offences that may trigger interception from seven years' imprisonment to possibly three.
The two most controversial items involve establishing an offence for failing to assist in the decryption of communications, and mandatory data retention for up to two years.
What do these mean?
For one thing, people may be imprisoned for failing to provide the key to encrypted data or simply refusing to give up passwords. In other words, intelligence agencies may extract evidence where they believe it resides even if they have not established what it is or even if it's there — and you could be charged for not helping. The offence presumably applies even if you are a third party. (A similar law has been in place in the UK since 2007.)
Mandatory data retention, on the other hand, compels ISPs to store telecommunications content for the prescribed two years. This means data generated even by non ASIO targets, people like you and me, would be stored so it could be mined for current and future, unspecified investigations.
These proposals, like many post-9/11 security measures, are presented as being for our good. According to JCIS chair Anthony Byrne, 'It is vital that our security laws keep pace with the rapid developments in technology.'
The inquiry discussion paper identifies challenges posed to the intelligence sector: dominance of communication via internet protocol, diversity of the telecommunications sector, and the highly variable protection mechanisms employed by people who wish to avoid detection.
The paper also lists anonymous pre-paid services, inter-carrier roaming agreements, calling cards and online subscription