The United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP21) in Paris later this month is set to become the last opportunity for meaningful global action. The stars have aligned in ways that bear optimism.
The lead-up to the conference provides textbook material for propelling change. But in order to better understand these variables — and appreciate the difference that a few years can make — it is worth revisiting why Copenhagen was such a disaster.
The Copenhagen Accord was a non-legally binding backroom deal drafted by five nations (United States, China, India, South Africa and Brazil), which struck no real targets for emissions reduction. During negotiations, a previously agreed target of 80 per cent cuts by 2050 was dropped, and the 1.5 Celsius ceiling favoured by island-states and low-lying nations was also removed. There were no formal preparations for a post-Kyoto Protocol mandate.
In the immediate aftermath, much was made about the machinations by the Chinese delegation to dilute the language of the deal. China didn't need the deal. Its key interest at the time was protecting its coal-based economy. Copenhagen demonstrated, perhaps for the first time anywhere, that China was not afraid to test its muscularity against other global powers.
There were other elements at play, much of it involving domestic politics rather than international. Not all members of the European Union regard climate change as a priority in the way Germany and France do. The EU also prefers a US-friendly position, which means that it could only acquiesce to the Accord.
Barack Obama himself did not have much leverage, having only been a year in office, facing an economic recession and a Congress that was hostile to his healthcare reforms. Without a robust signal from the United States regarding targets, other countries become reticent about theirs.
In the six years since, however, the impetus for a binding international agreement to tackle the severity and effects of climate change has taken a turn.
The stark visual aftermath of recent events like Typhoon Haiyan present their own case, and do so more compellingly than decades of peer-reviewed scientific research. In fact there is evidence that public attitudes to climate change can be affected by extreme weather. It is getting more difficult for people to insist that there is nothing at all wrong.
The non-cynical view of such malleability is that the humanitarian cost of catastrophe appeals to values around life and prosperity. Even those who may not